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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
1. Does an ISP acquire the contents of its 
customers’ electronic communications within 
the meaning of the ECPA when the ISP uses a 
device intentionally to redirect the customers’ 
communication to a third party without the 
consent of any party to the communications. 
 
2. Does the fact that an ISP transmits 
customers’ electronic communications in its 
ordinary course of business mean that an ISP 
acts within the ordinary course of business 
and therefore does not engage in interception 
when it reconfigures its network intentionally 
to redirect customers’ communications to a 
third party without the consent of any party to 
the communications. 
 
ii 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
 
Petitioners Kathleen and Terry Kirch 
respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review 
the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit in this case. 
 
OPINIONS BELOW 
 
The opinion of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is published at 702 
F.3d 1245 and reproduced at Pet.App.1a. The district 
court’s unreported opinion is reproduced at 
Pet.App.20a. 
 
JURISDICTION 
 
The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, entering judgment on December 
28, 2012. The time for filing a petition for rehearing 
elapsed 45 days later, on February 11, 2013. Fed. R. 
App. P. 35(c), 40(a)(1). This Court has jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 
 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
 
Pertinent portions of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et 
seq., are reproduced in the appendix to this petition. 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
This case presents the important federal 
question of whether an ISP’s wholesale redirection of 
its customers’ Internet communications to an 
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unintended recipient without customer consent lies 
outside the ISP’s ordinary course of business and 
constitutes interception under the ECPA.  
 
Here, Internet services provider Embarq, 
unbeknownst to its customers, installed a device in 
its Internet services network facility to transmit all 
customer Internet communications to an online 
advertising network. As part of that installation, 
Embarq recabled its network to redirect customers’ 
communications through the device before resuming 
the path to their intended, Internet-connected 
recipients. The third-party ad network paid Embarq 
for its access to the Embarq customer 
communications. 
 
The Tenth Circuit held Embarq did not 
engage in interception because Embarq did not, 
itself, extract any substantive content from the 
communications and therefore did not acquire the 
communications within the meaning of ECPA. The 
court further held that, to the extent the ISP 
acquired or accessed communications, its ordinary 
course of business as an ISP was to transmit 
communications and, since it did not extract 
anything from them, its conduct constituted no more 
than the ordinary course of business.  
 
A. Statutory Background. 
 
1. Electronic communications. 
 
“The Electronic Communications Privacy Act 
[ECPA] amends Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968—the Federal 
3 
wiretap law—to protect against the unauthorized 
interception of electronic communications.” S. Rep. 
No. 99-541, p. 43 (1986), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 1986, p. 3555. “The bill amends the 1968 law 
to update and clarify Federal privacy protections and 
standards in light of dramatic changes in new 
computer and telecommunications technologies.” Id.  
 
An electronic communication includes “any 
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, 
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in 
whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photoelectric, or photooptical system that affects 
interstate or foreign commerce,” with certain 
exceptions unrelated to this case. 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2510(12). Under the definition of “electronic 
communications” adopted in the ECPA, 
“[c]ommunications consisting solely of data, for 
example, . . . are electronic communications.” S. Rep. 
No. 99-541, p. 43 (1986), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 1986, p. 3568. Congress deliberately choose a 
broad, functional definition because, as key sponsor 
Representative Kastenmeier noted at the time: 
 
[T]he Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act, is an attempt to react to 
and anticipate problems with the 
interception and privacy of new 
communications technologies. . . . Any 
attempt to write a law which tries to 
protect only those technologies which 
exist in the marketplace today—that is, 
cellular phones and electronic mail—is 
destined to be outmoded in a few years. 
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132 Cong. Rec. H4039-01 (June 23, 1986) (statement 
of Rep. Kastenmeier).  
 
The ECPA provides a civil remedy for any 
person whose electronic communication is 
wrongfully intercepted. 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) and  
§ 2510(4). “[T]he same civil remedies are available 
whether the communication was ‘oral,’ ‘wire,’ or 
‘electronic,’ as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2510.” 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 524 (2001).  
 
2. ECPA, ISPs and the Internet. 
 
“When you send an email or other data over 
the Internet, you send it first to the ISP with which 
you have service.” Steven R. Morrison, What The 
Cops Can’t Do, Internet Service Providers Can: 
Preserving Privacy in Email Contents, 16 VA. J.L. & 
TECH. 253, 263 (2011). “Everything we say, hear, 
read, or do on the Internet first passes through ISP 
computers.” Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive 
ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1420 
(2009). As a result, “[t]he potential threat to privacy 
from unchecked ISP surveillance surpasses every 
other threat online.” Id. at 1420  
 
 Congress clearly recognized the unique threat 
posed by service providers possessing such 
considerable access to our electronic communica-
tions. For example, the ECPA provides that, aside 
from a few specific exclusions (such as disclosures 
necessary to the provision of services or actually 
consented to by a user): 
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[A] person or entity providing an 
electronic communication service to the 
public shall not intentionally divulge 
the contents of any communication 
(other than one to such person or entity, 
or an agent thereof) while in 
transmission on that service to any 
person or entity other than an 
addressee or intended recipient of such 
communication or an agent of such 
addressee or intended recipient.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a). In other words, absent 
disclosures that are necessary, an ISP’s divulging 
the contents of its customers’ communication is 
statutorily excluded from the scope of its ordinary 
business. Id.  
 
Communications protected under the ECPA 
include data in transmission on the Internet. “The 
ECPA adopts a ‘broad, functional’ definition of an 
electronic communication.” In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 
329 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2003), quoting Brown v. 
Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 289 (4th Cir. 1995); see also 
Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 705, citing United 
States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 69 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(en banc) (definition of interception under the 
Wiretap Act includes packet-switch technology as 
well as circuit-switch technology). 
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B. Material Facts. 
 
1. Embarq redirected the Kirches’ 
Internet communications to a 
third-party.  
 
Respondents—United Telephone Co. of 
Eastern Kansas dba Embarq and Embarq 
Management Co. (collectively “Embarq”)—are an 
Internet Service Provider (ISP). Petitioners Kathleen 
and Terry Kirch were customers of Embarq’s 
Internet services in Gardner, Kansas. This case 
concerns a 90-day period in the first half of 2008, 
when Embarq diverted virtually all Internet 
communications of the Kirches and its other 26,000 
Gardner customers to a third party, NebuAd. 
NebuAd, an online advertising company, paid 
Embarq $29,143 for redirecting the data, which 
Embarq analyzed and used to serve behaviorally 
targeted online advertisements. The Kirches alleged 
they did not consent to the redirection of their 
communications. 
 
2. Embarq reconfigured its network 
indiscriminately to redirect all 
Internet communications of its 
customers. 
 
Embarq accomplished the redirection by 
licensing from NebuAd a device, called an Ultra 
Transparent Appliance (UTA), and physically 
installing the device in the network through which 
Embarq provided Internet services to customers. 
Embarq rerouted the cables carrying its customers’ 
Internet traffic so that “[a]ll Internet traffic that 
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passed through [Embarq’s] Gardner point of 
presence flowed through NebuAd’s UTA.” 
Pet.App.27a (emphasis added).1    
 
C. Proceedings Below. 
 
1. The Kirches file suit. 
 
 The present putative class action was filed by 
the Kirches against Embarq in 2010 in the United 
States District Court for the District of Kansas.2 
Jurisdiction was based on both 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (for 
federal claims arising under ECPA) as well as 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). The Kirches seek damages and 
other relief for themselves and a class of other 
customers of Embarq’s Internet services who had 
their Internet communications diverted by Embarq 
to NebuAd in violation of the ECPA. 
 
2. The district court grants Embarq’s 
summary judgment motion. 
 
 Embarq moved for summary judgment 
arguing: (1) it did not acquire the contents of its 
                                                 
1 The district court’s statement quoted above was, in 
turn, a verbatim quote from Embarq’s own statements of 
undisputed facts in support of its motion for summary 
judgment. As explained by an Embarq expert witness, “The 
device was placed on [Embarq’s] network in such a way that all 
Internet traffic streaming through [Embarq’s] network would 
also pass through the UTA.” Pet.App.13a (emphasis added). 
2 An earlier-filed action in the Northern District of 
California was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over 
Embarq. Pet.App.22a. That case proceeded as to claims against 
NebuAd (PetApp.22a) and was later resolved by a settlement. 
Pet.App.8a. 
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customers’ Internet communications; (2) the 
customers consented to disclosing their 
communications; or (3) the disclosures were not 
interceptions because the UTA device was being 
used by Embarq in the ordinary course of its 
business.  
 
The district court granted the motion. 
Pet.App.21a. The district court acknowledged that 
the Kirches were asserting “Embarq intercepted 
communications by routing them to NebuAd’s UTA.” 
Pet.App.35a. Nonetheless, according to the district 
court, “[P]laintiffs’ theory rests on the notion that 
the NebuAd System extracted the contents of the 
communications.” Pet.App.36a. Applying this 
“notion,” the court decided that Embarq did not 
acquire the contents of the Kirches’ Internet 
communications. Pet.App.36a-37a. 
 
The district court also found that the Kirches 
“gave or acquiesced their consent to any monitoring 
or interception of their Internet activity.” 
Pet.App.42a. The district court did not reach the 
suggestion that Embarq used the UTA to divert 
communications in the ordinary course of its 
business.   
 
3. The Tenth Circuit affirms on 
limited grounds. 
 
 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the summary 
judgment. Pet.App.1a. Like the district court, the 
Tenth Circuit focused on whether Embarq acquired 
the contents of information compiled by NebuAd (as 
opposed to whether, under the ECPA, Embarq 
9 
acquired the contents of its customers’ Internet 
communications when it redirected them to 
NebuAd). Pet.App.3a, 7a-8a, 12a-15a. The Tenth 
Circuit observed that Embarq merely “had access to 
users’ data that it necessarily had as an ISP” and 
that “NebuAd’s use of the UTA gave Embarq access 
to no more of its users’ electronic communications 
than it had in the ordinary course of its business as 
an ISP.” Pet.App.14a. 
 
 The Kirches also appealed the district court’s 
ruling as to consent. However, the Tenth Circuit did 
not adjudicate this issue. Pet.App.12a. 
 
REASONS THE WRIT SHOULD BE GRANTED 
 
The present case illustrates the significant 
harm to societal interests in communication privacy 
if an ISP is considered to be permitted, in the 
ordinary course of its business, to sell its customer’s 
private communications to the highest bidder. The 
Tenth Circuit, in allowing an ISP to escape liability 
for redirecting the Internet communications of the 
ISP’s customers to a third party simply because the 
ISP did not, itself, read or extract information from 
the communications, has raised an important 
question of federal law that has not been, but should 
be, settled by this Court.  
 
This case presents an important federal law 
question of whether ISPs, the universally relied 
upon purveyors of Internet communications, may 
freely transmit those communications to parties 
other than the intended recipients. The answer to 
this question affects nothing less than the privacy of 
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communications in what has perhaps become our 
society’s most heavily trafficked avenue of 
communication. As Justice Rehnquist observed:  
 
Technology now permits millions  
of important and confidential 
conversations to occur through a vast 
system of electronic networks. These 
advances, however, raise significant 
privacy concerns. We are placed in the 
uncomfortable position of not knowing 
who might have access to our personal 
and business e-mails, our medical and 
financial records, or our cordless and 
cellular telephone conversations. 
 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 542 (2001) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1097, 
at 69, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1968, pp. 
2112, 2156); see also U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[p]eople 
disclose . . . the books, groceries, and medications 
they purchase to online retailers”). 
 
Given the entrusted role ISPs play in daily 
communications, both personal and business, it is 
critical that the ECPA be interpreted as prohibiting 
ISPs from redirecting communications at will rather 
than, as in this case, excusing redirection by adding 
new elements to the ECPA and, as a backstop, 
excusing it as the ordinary course of business. If 
ISPs are allowed to escape liability simply because 
they redirect communications without first reading 
them, the ECPA effectively provides no protection 
against ISPs’ routinely selling customer 
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communications to the highest bidder, either in bulk, 
or even for premiums based on particular, highly 
valued customers. 
 
Paul Olm’s article The Rise and Fall of 
Invasive ISP Surveillance, succinctly captures the 
heightened privacy concerns that arise under the 
particular facts presented in this matter: 
 
[N]othing in society poses as grave a 
threat to privacy as the ISP, not even 
Google, a company whose privacy 
practices have received an inordinate 
amount of criticism and commentary. 
Although Google collects a vast amount 
of personal information about its users, 
an ISP can always access even more 
because it owns and operates a 
privileged network bottleneck, the only 
point on the network that sits between a 
user and the rest of the Internet. 
Because of this fact about network 
design, a user cannot say anything to 
Google without saying it first to his ISP, 
and an ISP can also hear everything a 
user says to any other websites like 
Facebook or eBay, things said that are 
unobtainable to Google. The potential 
threat to privacy from unchecked ISP 
surveillance surpasses every other 
threat online. 
 
Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP 
Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1417, 1420 (2009). 
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Further, the decision below conflicts with 
circuits that have recognized that one can only 
redirect what one has already acquired. As has been 
stated, “Redirection presupposes interception.” See, 
e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d 130, 136 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 847 (1992) and U.S. 
v. Luong, 471 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006). The 
decision below also conflicts with circuits that have 
recognized the distinction between the initial 
capture of a communication and subsequent 
listening to it. See, e.g., United States v. Shields, 675 
F.2d 1152, 1156 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
858 (1982); United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 659 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). The 
Tenth Circuit’s decision is antithetical to the 
requirement, in government searches and seizures, 
that a warrant be issued to install a device to collect 
communications, not merely to listen to 
communications that have already been collected 
through such as device. See, e.g., Katz v. U.S., 389 
U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967) (warrant required for 
surveillance by placing wiretap on outside of phone 
booth). 
 
Privacy of communication is an important 
interest. The ECPA helps to protect the “right to be 
let alone” as well as promote “the interest . . . in 
fostering private speech.” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 536 
(Breyer, J., concurring), quoting Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). As this Court has recognized, “fear of 
public disclosure of private conversations might well 
have a chilling effect on private speech.” Bartnicki, 
532 U.S. at 532-533. Even a plausible threat to 
communications strike at core values in our society: 
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In a democratic society privacy of 
communication is essential if citizens 
are to think and act creatively and 
constructively. Fear or suspicion that 
one’s speech is being monitored by a 
stranger, even without the reality of 
such activity, can have a seriously 
inhibiting effect upon the willingness to 
voice critical and constructive ideas. 
 
Id. at 533 (quoting President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 202 (1967)); see 
also, id. at 543 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same). It 
is entirely appropriate that Congress has prohibited 
unauthorized interception of communicative content 
that the interceptor does not, itself, read, hear, or 
extract, or access. Here, Embarq was able to provide 
a complete version of the communications to an 
unintended party and that is enough. 
 
 Pervasively, Americans trust their ISPs to 
deliver all manner of personal and business 
communications to the intended recipients. “[T]he 
content on the Internet is as diverse as human 
thought.” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 
521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). The necessary trust  
placed in an ISP, and its necessary access  
to communications, justifies the Congressional 
prohibition against its redirection of 
communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a). 
Allowing ISPs to divert Internet communications 
under the circumstances at issue here will have far-
reaching and negative consequences for a society 
that values the privacy of communications. 
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A. An electronic communication is 
intercepted when, without lawful 
purpose, the whole of it is redirected to 
an unintended recipient, regardless of 
whether communicative content is 
subsequently extracted from it. 
 
Without discussion, the Tenth Circuit began 
with an unfounded distinction between 
communications consisting of data and “information 
the NebuAd System extracted from the 
communications” that Embarq diverted. Pet.App.3a, 
7a-8a, 10a. The court wrongly presumed that 
information must be extracted from communications 
for the contents to have been acquired under the 
statute. See, e.g., Pet.App.3a (“NebuAd acquired 
various information about Embarq users . . . 
Embarq’s access to that information . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). In fact, the data redirected by 
Embarq and provided to NebuAd (i.e., all Internet 
traffic) obviously contained the contents of the 
Internet communications included within. Indeed, as 
a practical matter, when Embarq installed the UTA 
device and reconfigured the Internet traffic in its 
network facility, the full traffic stream, including 
communicative content, had no place to go but where 
Embarq redirected it; were that not so, those 
contents would never have reached NebuAd as they 
obviously did. 
 
Because the Tenth Circuit proceeded from the 
erroneous premise that interception could only be 
predicated on acquisition that reaches the point of 
extraction, the court improperly focused on the fact 
that Embarq did not acquire extracted content from 
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NebuAd. Pet.App.3a, 13a-14a. However, the 
interception in this case occurred when Embarq 
redirected the Kirches’ Internet communications, in 
their entirety, to NebuAd. In other words, the Tenth 
Circuit’s imposition of a new, extraction requirement 
caused it to look in the wrong direction.  
 
NebuAd was not the intended recipient of the 
Kirches’ communications. Embarq did not have the 
Kirches’ consent to redirect their communications to 
NebuAd, or anyone else. Embarq thus violated the 
ECPA by using a device to intentionally redirect 
such communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). 
 
The ECPA’s prohibition against unauthorized 
interception requires no inquiry into whether or how 
intercepted communications are used. Id. As the 
Seventh Circuit said of one interception defendant, 
“He did not learn anything worthwhile. But an 
intentional interception is enough; the prosecutor 
need not show that the spy obtained valuable 
information.” Szymuszkiewicz, 622 F.3d at 703; see 
also U.S. v. Townsend, 987 F.2d 927, 931 (2d Cir. 
1993) (“[a]ll that is relevant is that Townsend 
intentionally intercepted communications between 
two unknowing and unconsenting individuals”). 
 
Contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s opinion below, 
an interception in violation of the ECPA does not 
require that an electronic communication be read, 
heard, or extracted. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). Rather, an 
interception occurs “when the contents . . . are 
captured or redirected in any way.” Rodriguez, 968 
F.2d at 136.  
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The statute does not specify precisely 
where an interception is deemed to 
occur. It seems clear that when the 
contents of a wire communication are 
captured or redirected in any way, an 
interception occurs at that time. Such 
an interception plainly occurs at or near 
the situs of the telephone itself, for the 
contents of the conversation, whether 
bilateral as is usually the case, or 
multilateral as is the case with a 
conference call, are transmitted in one 
additional direction. Redirection 
presupposes interception. 
 
Id. at 136 (emphasis added); see also Luong, 471 
F.3d at 1109 (citing United States v. Ramirez, 112 
F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1997) and United States v. 
Denman, 100 F.3d 399, 403 (5th Cir. 1996)). In the 
present case, it is clear that Embarq intentionally 
caused the Kirches’ Internet communications to be 
transmitted to NebuAd, that is, as the Second 
Circuit put it in Rodriguez, “transmitted in one 
additional direction.” 
 
 Even construing the far more narrow term 
“aural acquisition,” courts have agreed that listening 
to the communication is not required to intercept. 
See Shields, 675 F.2d at 1156 (holding interception 
under the statute “occurred at the time the recording 
was made, not when persons listened to the tape”), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982); see also United 
States v. Nelson, 837 F.2d 1519, 1527 (11th Cir.) 
(“the term ‘intercept’ as it relates to ‘aural 
acquisitions’ refers to the place where a 
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communication is initially obtained regardless of 
where the communication is ultimately heard”), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 829 (1988); United States v. Turk, 
526 F.2d at 659 (“we conclude that no new and 
distinct interception occurs when the contents of a 
communication are revealed through the replaying of 
a previous recording”). In short, “the term ‘intercept’ 
as it relates to an ‘acquisition’ refers to the place 
where a communication is initially obtained” and 
“[w]hether the communication is heard by the 
human ear is irrelevant.” Amati v. City of Woodstock, 
Ill., 829 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill. 1993).  
 
For example, in Jacobson v. Rose, 592 F.2d 
515 (9th Cir. 1978), the court rejected an argument 
that a phone company should not be liable for its 
part in an illegal wiretap where the police, not the 
phone company, listened to the conversations.  
 
Nevada Bell contends that because none 
of its employees actually listened to 
tapped conversations, it has not violated 
the statute. 
. . . 
[W]e do not believe that Congress meant 
to allow those tapping phones to 
determine the possible scope of civil 
liability by their limiting who among 
them would listen to the tapes. 
 
Id. at 522. It is equally clear that Congress did not 
mean to allow parties to escape liability for 
redirecting electronic communications by their 
limiting who among them would read or extract 
information from the diverted communications.  
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If Congress had intended wiretap liability to 
depend on reading or extracting information rather 
than mere control over the transmittal of the 
communication sufficient to have acquired it, 
Congress clearly would have provided a very 
different definition of interception. As one court has 
recognized, when deciding that aural acquisition 
does not require listening: 
 
If Congress had intended the phrase 
“aural or other acquisition” to mean 
“overheard,” it certainly could have 
employed the simpler term. The 
section’s additional requirement that a 
conversation be acquired “through the 
use of any electronic, mechanical, or 
other device” suggests that it is the act 
of diverting, and not the act of listening, 
that constitutes an “interception.”  
 
In re State Police Litigation, 888 F. Supp. 1235, 1264 
(D. Conn. 1995).  
 
The statute simply does not require reading or 
visual acquisition of the contents of an electronic 
communication. Indeed, beyond “aural acquisition,” 
which does not require listening, the far broader 
term, “or other acquisition” was added by Congress 
for the specific purposes of protecting even 
communications consisting solely of data. S. Rep. No. 
99-541, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 1986, p. 3568. The new language 
extended privacy protection to new forms of 
computer-to-computer communications. Rodriguez, 
968 F.2d at 136, citing S. Rep. No. 99-541, 99th 
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Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 
1986, pp. 3555, 3555-57, 3562-65, 3567. “This 
amendment clarifies that it is illegal to intercept the 
non-voice portion of a wire communication. For 
example, it is illegal to intercept the data or digitized 
portion of a voice communication.” Id. at 3567.  
 
The very nature of the technologies involved 
renders communications unintelligible to human 
eyes and ears while in transmission on the Internet, 
precisely when such communications might be 
intercepted under the ECPA. Thus, if the contents of 
electronic communications are to be protected from 
interception while in transmission, they must be 
protected without requiring proof of inspection or 
extraction. The Tenth Circuit, by assuming that 
electronic communications must be extracted to have 
been intercepted, improperly added a requirement 
that the statute was designed to avoid. 
 
Additionally, if the Tenth Circuit decision 
stands and extraction becomes a prerequisite for a 
finding of interception, then a violation of the statute 
could occur every time the same raw data is 
translated into an intelligible form—i.e., a new 
violation each time a particular computer file is 
opened. Of course, “[t]his cannot be what Congress 
intended.” See In re State Police Litigation, 888 F. 
Supp. at 1265 (“Defendants’ proposed interpretation, 
in contrast, leads to bizarre results. If an 
interception occurs only when a defendant actually 
listens to a recorded conversation, a violation of the 
Act could occur on every subsequent occasion when 
that recording is replayed.”) (citing Turk, 526 F.2d at 
658.) 
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 Construed properly, the ECPA’s prohibition 
against unauthorized interception of an electronic 
communication while in transmission requires that 
the interceptor acquire, that is, possess or exercise 
control over the communication, including its 
contents; interception does not require the 
extraction, translation, reading, or use of the 
contents. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4); see, e.g., Klumb v. 
Goan, 884 F. Supp. 2d 644, 661 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) 
(interception occurred when computer program 
caused duplicate of e-mail “to be rerouted 
automatically through the Internet to a third party 
address”); Shefts v. Petrakis, 758 F. Supp. 2d 620, 
630 (C.D. Ill. 2010) (interception occurred when 
surveillance software “acquired and logged Plaintiff’s 
text messages” and not when the defendants 
subsequently accessed them). 
 
Embarq has suggested the data it redirected 
was like a letter inside a sealed envelope that 
Embarq did not read. One problem with Embarq’s 
envelope analogy is that it ignores the facts of this 
case. Here, it would be somewhat more fitting to 
analogize that Embarq was entrusted to deliver a 
postcard to the intended recipient. However, before 
it did so, Embarq copied the postcard and sent the 
copy to NebuAd. Under the ECPA, it does not matter 
whether Embarq “peeked” at the postcard while 
copying it. It is enough that, just as Embarq 
acquired the postcard enough to send it on its lawful 
way, it was Embarq’s acquisition that enabled 
Embarq to redirect it. Otherwise, if Embarq did not 
acquire the contents of the Kirches Internet 
communications, those communications could not 
have reached NebuAd as well as intended recipients.  
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Embarq obviously did acquire the contents of 
the communications at issue, or it could not have 
redirected them. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 136 
(“[r]edirection presupposes interception”). If Embarq 
had examined the contents, but for some lawful 
purpose, it still would not excuse its redirection; the 
fact that Embarq did not examine the 
communications before redirecting them is 
irrelevant to any analysis under the ECPA. 
 
B. The ECPA presupposes an ISP’s 
acquisition of customers’ electronic 
communications.  
 
An ISP necessarily acquires its customers’ 
Internet communications, in their entirety, including 
contents, by assuming control over those 
communications to transmit them. When ISPs help 
those communications reach their intended 
destination, there is obviously no interception under 
the ECPA. Indeed, the ECPA provides that an ISP 
may direct a communication to others whose job it is 
to “forward such communication to its destination.” 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(b)(iii). However, it is an entirely 
different matter when an ISP, instead, intentionally 
redirects a customer’s communication to a third 
party that is not the intended recipient and who has 
nothing to do with forwarding the communication to 
its destination. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a) (ISP “shall 
not intentionally divulge the contents of any 
communication . . . while in transmission on that 
service to any person or entity other than an 
addressee or intended recipient.”). 
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The Tenth Circuit held that “NebuAd’s use of 
the UTA gave Embarq access to no more of its users’ 
electronic communications than it had in the 
ordinary course of its business as an ISP.” 
Pet.App.14a-15a. Of course, as an ISP, Embarq had 
essentially total access to its customers’ Internet 
communications. Embarq clearly had sufficient 
access to the communications at issue to be able to 
redirect them to a third party. As explained in the 
previous section of this petition, the definition of 
interception is satisfied when one takes sufficient 
control of an electronic communication such that it 
communication is “transmitted in one additional 
direction.” Rodriguez, 968 F.2d at 136. Because 
Embarq clearly had sufficient control and possession 
of the Internet communications to redirect them to 
NebuAd, no further inquiry into acquisition is 
necessary.  
 
If the Tenth Circuit meant that Embarq 
redirected these communications in the ordinary 
course of its business as an ISP, such a holding 
would be directly contrary to the ECPA. Other than 
matters that are necessary to providing service, the 
ECPA specifically excludes redirecting 
communications from the ordinary business of an 
ISP:  
 
 [A] person or entity providing an 
electronic communication service to the 
public shall not intentionally divulge 
the contents of any communication 
(other than one to such person or entity, 
or an agent thereof) while in 
transmission on that service to any 
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person or entity other than an 
addressee or intended recipient of such 
communication or an agent of such 
addressee or intended recipient.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)(a). In other words, aside from 
specific and limited exceptions not applicable here, 
one thing that Congress has excluded from being 
part of ISP’s ordinary business is redirecting its 
customers’ communications. Id. Although, 
hypothetically, a necessary redirection might be 
considered part of an ISP’s ordinary business, there 
has been no argument or evidence in this case that 
Embarq’s redirection of communications to NebuAd 
was necessary to Embarq’s provision of services to 
customers or any other business necessity. 
 
The Tenth Circuit failed to point to any 
provision of the ECPA or any case law that actually 
supports the notion that, by virtue of an ISP’s mere 
access to customer communications in the ordinary 
course of business, the ISP may intentionally 
redirect those communications, without consent, to 
third parties not designated as recipients.  
 
Ironically, the single case cited by the court as 
supporting its conclusion is Hall v. EarthLink 
Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500 (2005). Hall does not 
involve an ISP redirecting communications to an 
unintended third party. In fact, Hall does not even 
involve a third party. Rather, the case involves an 
ISP and a user. The ISP stored emails at the user’s 
old address on the ISP’s system. The emails were not 
redirected to any third party. As explained by the 
district court in the case, the ISP “merely received 
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and stored e-mails precisely where they were sent—
to an address on the Earthlink system.” Hall v. 
Earthlink Network, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 5489 (RO), 2003 
WL 22990064 (S.D.N.Y. December 19, 2003). 
Unsurprisingly, the court held that storing emails 
“precisely where they were sent” was done by the 
ISP in the ordinary course of business.  
 
In the present case, the ISP did the exact 
opposite of directing communications precisely 
where they were sent. Here, Embarq intentionally 
redirected its customers’ communications to 
NebuAd. Hall does not support the conclusion 
reached by the Tenth Circuit in the present case. 
Nothing in the ECPA supports that conclusion 
either.  
 
C. Remand is necessary. 
 
Because of the Tenth Circuit’s erroneous 
construction of “interception” under the ECPA, it 
never reached the question of whether Embarq 
established as a matter of law that the Kirches 
consented to the interception at issue. Petitioners 
respectfully request that this court grant this 
petition, reverse the court of appeals, and remand 
this case to the court of appeals to address the issue 
of consent.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a 
writ of certiorari should be granted. 
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Judges. 
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HARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
____________________________________ 
 
 Plaintiffs Kathleen and Terry Kirch appeal 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants United Telephone Company of 
Eastern Kansas and Embarq Management Company 
(collectively “Embarq”) on the Kirches’ claim that 
Embarq intercepted their Internet communications 
in violation of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 
Stat. 1848. Embarq is an Internet service provider 
(ISP). The alleged interceptions occurred when 
Embarq authorized NebuAd, Inc., an online 
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advertising company, to conduct a technology test for 
directing online advertising to the users most likely 
to be interested in the ads. Exercising jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s 
judgment. Although NebuAd acquired various 
information about Embarq users during the course 
of the technology test, Embarq cannot be liable as an 
aider and abettor. And it was undisputed that 
Embarq’s access to that information was no different 
from its access to any other data flowing over its 
network. Because this access was only in the 
ordinary course of providing Internet services as an 
ISP, this access did not constitute an interception 
within the meaning of the statute. 
 
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
 
 The ECPA prohibits the interception of 
“electronic communication,” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1), and 
imposes criminal and civil liability, see id. §§ 2511(4) 
(criminal penalties); § 2520 (civil liability for 
damages). Traffic on the Internet is electronic 
communication. See id. § 2510(12) (defining 
electronic communication as “any transfer of signs, 
signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence 
of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a 
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or 
photooptical system”). 
 
 The statute defines intercept as “the aural or 
other acquisition of the contents of any wire, 
electronic, or oral communication through the use of 
any electronic, mechanical, or other device.” Id.  
§ 2510(4) (emphasis added). No “interception,” and 
hence no violation of the ECPA, occurs if the 
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contents of a communication are acquired in the 
ordinary course of business of an ISP because the 
Act’s definition of electronic, mechanical, or other 
device excludes “any telephone or telegraph 
instrument, equipment or facility, or any component 
thereof . . . (ii) being used by a provider of wire or 
electronic communication service in the ordinary 
course of its business . . . .” Id. § 2510(5)(a); see Hall 
v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 396 F.3d 500, 503–05 (2d 
Cir. 2005). An interception to which a party to the 
communication consents also is not prohibited. See 
id. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall not be unlawful under this 
chapter for a person . . . to intercept a wire, oral, or 
electronic communication . . . where one of the 
parties to the communication has given prior consent 
to such interception . . . .”) 
 
 The ECPA imposes civil liability on those who 
unlawfully intercept electronic communications. It 
states: 
 
Except as provided in section 
2511(2)(a)(ii) [relating to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978], 
any person whose wire, oral or 
electronic communication is intercepted, 
disclosed, or intentionally used in 
violation of this chapter may in a civil 
action recover from the person or entity, 
other than the United States, which 
engaged in that violation such relief as 
may be appropriate. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (emphasis added). This language 
does not encompass aiders or abettors. The only 
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persons liable are those who engaged in “that 
violation.” And the natural reading of “that 
violation” is the “intercept[ion], disclos[ure], or 
intentional[] use[] . . . in violation of [the statute].” In 
other words, “the person or entity . . . which engaged 
in that violation” is the person or entity that 
“intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used” the 
communication. The provision includes no aiding-
and-abetting language. As the Supreme Court has 
said: 
 
Congress has not enacted a general civil 
aiding and abetting statute . . . . Thus, 
when Congress enacts a statute under 
which a person may sue and recover 
damages from a private defendant for 
the defendant’s violation of some 
statutory norm, there is no general 
presumption that the plaintiff may also 
sue aiders and abettors. 
 
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 182 (1994). 
 
 Any temptation to read the statute as 
imposing aider-and-abettor liability is overcome by 
the illuminating statutory history of the civil-
liability provision. The 1968 predecessor to the 
ECPA imposed both criminal and civil liability for 
those who procured an interception. The criminal 
provision, codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1968), 
held responsible “any person who . . . willfully 
intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any 
other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, 
any wire or oral communication.” Pub. L. No. 90-351, 
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Title III § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 213 (1968) (emphasis 
added). (Later paragraphs made it a crime to 
willfully disclose or use unlawfully intercepted 
communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c), (d) 
(1968).) Similarly, the civilliability provision stated: 
“Any person whose wire or oral communication is 
intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of this 
chapter shall . . . have a civil cause of action against 
any person who intercepts, discloses, or uses, or 
procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or 
use such communications.” Id., 82 Stat. at 223 
(emphasis added) (enacting former 18 U.S.C.  
§ 2520). When the ECPA was enacted in 1986, the 
criminal provision was changed only to replace 
“willfully” by “intentionally” and to add “electronic” 
communications to “wire” and “oral” ones. See 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). But the civil provision was 
altered in additional ways, including deletion of the 
“procures” clause. We presume that this deletion was 
intended to change the statute’s meaning. See Stone 
v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995); Antonin Scalia & 
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation 
of Legal Texts § 40 (2012) (“If the legislature amends 
or reenacts a provision other than by way of a 
consolidating statute or restyling project, a 
significant change in language is presumed to entail 
a change in meaning.”). Accordingly, almost all 
courts to address the issue have held that § 2520 
does not impose civil liability on aiders or abettors. 
See Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 169 (5th 
Cir. 2000); Council on Am.-Islamic Relations Action 
Network, Inc. v. Gaubatz, No. 09-02030, 2012 WL 
4054141, *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2012) (collecting 
cases). But see Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F. Supp. 2d 
419, 427–28 (E.D.N.Y 2006). 
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II. THE TECHNOLOGY TEST 
 
 In November 2007 Embarq entered into an 
agreement with NebuAd to conduct a test of what is 
referred to as the NebuAd System. The physical 
components of the system were an Ultra 
Transparent Appliance (UTA) and remote servers 
(apparently in California) hosted by NebuAd. The 
system’s purported purpose was to “allow[] for 
placement of optimized advertisement on Trial 
customers’ internet browser screens.” Aplt. App., 
Vol. I at 92. The test began in mid-December 2007 
and ended in March 2008. Under the agreement the 
UTA was installed in Embarq’s network in Gardner, 
Kansas, where the Kirches were customers of 
Embarq. Embarq’s Gardner users were connected to 
the UTA, which was connected to the rest of 
Embarq’s network. According to the Kirches, the 
Internet traffic that passed through the UTA was 
sent to the NebuAd servers in its system. NebuAd 
used the UTA to track what websites an Embarq 
user visited, and to deliver online advertising 
thought likely to interest users who visited those 
websites. 
 
 Embarq asserts that the NebuAd System 
collected only information about customer requests 
for highly trafficked commercial websites, and 
obtained only three pieces of information about such 
requests: the requested Uniform Resource Locator 
(URL, known in common parlance as a web page’s 
“address”), the “referer URL” (the last URL visited 
before the request), and an advertising network 
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cookie.1 Because cookies are typically encrypted, the 
NebuAd System did not extract any information 
from them. Users’ computers were assigned 
identification numbers based on these cookies, and 
the information about past Internet usage was 
associated with a user’s computer only through this 
number. The Kirches contend, however, that the 
UTA “intercepted and analyzed” all Internet traffic 
from affected customers, id. at 61, not only their 
requests for highly trafficked commercial websites. 
 
III. PROCEEDINGS IN DISTRICT COURT 
 
 The Kirches sued Embarq in the United 
States District Court for the District of Kansas on 
behalf of themselves and other Embarq customers. 
They asserted four claims arising out of the NebuAd 
test: unlawful interception of communications in 
violation of the ECPA; accessing plaintiffs’ 
computers without authorization, in violation of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, see 18 U.S.C.  
§ 1030(a), (g); invasion of privacy under Kansas state 
law; and trespass to chattels under Kansas state 
law. The latter three claims were dismissed with 
prejudice by joint stipulation of the parties.2 
 
 Embarq then moved for summary judgment 
on the unlawful-interception claim. It argued that  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 1 “A cookie is a piece of text, usually encrypted, that is 
sent to a user’s computer by a website. When the user later 
returns to the website, the website recognizes the cookie and 
thus is able to track a user’s behavior over time.” Aplt. App., 
Vol. II at 278. 
 
 2 The Kirches sued NebuAd in a separate proceeding. 
At oral argument we were informed that the case was settled. 
9a 
?
(1) the NebuAd System had not intercepted users’ 
communications, because the limited information it 
acquired about their Internet communications did 
not include the contents of those communications;  
(2) even if user communications were intercepted by 
the NebuAd System, it was not Embarq that had 
intercepted the communications, because Embarq 
did not have access to the data collected by the 
NebuAd System or the user profiles that NebuAd 
developed; (3) the Kirches had consented to any 
alleged interception by agreeing to the terms of 
Embarq’s privacy policy, which gave users notice 
that their Internet communications could be shared 
with third parties to the extent that the NebuAd test 
had done so; and (4) if Embarq had acquired the 
contents of any of its users’ communications, it had 
done so only in the ordinary course of its business 
activities as an ISP, and so was not liable under the 
ECPA. 
 
 The district court granted Embarq’s motion in 
August 2011. It first ruled that Embarq had not 
intercepted the Kirches’ communications. It 
explained: 
 
Plaintiffs argue that Embarq 
intercepted communications by routing 
them to NebuAd’s UTA. The term 
“intercept” is specifically defined by the 
ECPA to mean the “acquisition of the 
contents” of a communication.[] 
“Contents” is defined to mean “the 
substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.” Although the term 
“acquisition” is not defined by the 
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statute, “to acquire” commonly means 
“to come into possession, control, or 
power of disposal.” Thus, it follows that 
in order to “intercept” a communication, 
one must come into possession or 
control of the substance, purport, or 
meaning of that communication. The 
Court agrees with Embarq that 
regardless of what information the 
NebuAd System extracted from the 
communications traversing through the 
UTA, it is undisputed that Embarq  
had no access to that information or to 
the profiles constructed from that 
information. As plaintiffs’ expert 
testified, Embarq’s role was to install 
the NebuAd device so as to furnish the 
UTA connection to NebuAd. In other 
words, the NebuAd device, or “box,” goes 
into place, then all of the raw data that 
flows through Embarq is directed to 
that device, where NebuAd does the 
analysis and, apparently, separates out 
the Port 80 traffic [apparently, traffic to 
websites whose addresses begin with 
“http://”]. Moreover, plaintiffs cite no 
authority that Embarq’s access to the 
raw data that flowed through its 
network constitutes a violation of the 
ECPA, which requires an entity to 
actually acquire the contents of those 
communications. There is nothing in the 
record that Embarq itself acquired the 
contents of any communications as they 
flowed through its network; instead, 
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plaintiffs’ theory rests on the  
notion that the NebuAd System 
extracted the contents of the 
communications. Plaintiffs’ assertion 
that Embarq “endeavored to intercept” 
communications falls short of creating 
civil liability under the ECPA, which 
creates liability for actual interception. 
 
Mem. & Order at 13–14 (footnotes omitted), Kirch v. 
Embarq Mgmt. Co., No. 10-2047-JAR (D. Kan. Aug. 
19, 2011)(Aplt. Br., Ex. A at 13–14). The court then 
rejected the argument that Embarq could be liable 
on a theory of aiding and abetting NebuAd. In the 
alternative, the court ruled that the Kirches had 
consented to any interception by agreeing to the 
terms of Embarq’s privacy policy. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
 We review de novo the district court’s 
summary-judgment decision, evaluating the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. See Vaughn v. 
Epworth Villa, 537 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 2008). 
A district court can grant summary judgment only if 
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” 
and “the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 
 Like the district court, we need not address 
whether NebuAd intercepted any of the Kirches’ 
electronic communications. Because the ECPA 
creates no aiding-and-abetting civil liability,  
Embarq is liable only if it itself intercepted those 
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communications. Also, although the district court 
relied on consent as an alternative ground for 
summary judgment, we need not consider the issue 
because we hold that there was no interception. 
 
 We largely agree with the district court’s 
analysis. As we explain below, it is undisputed that 
the only access Embarq had to the data extracted by 
NebuAd was in its capacity as an ISP, not because of 
any special relationship with NebuAd or the 
technology test. We need not decide where to draw 
the line between access to data and acquisition of 
data, because Embarq’s access was in the ordinary 
course of its core business as an ISP transmitting 
data over its equipment. Even if such access might 
be deemed an acquisition, Embarq did not engage in 
an “interception” under the ECPA because of the 
ordinary-course-of-business exclusion from the 
definition of interception. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(4) 
(defining intercept as the “acquisition of the contents 
of any . . . electronic . . . communication” by use of an 
“electronic, mechanical or other device”); 
2510(5)(a)(ii) (excluding from the definition of 
“electronic, mechanical or other device” any 
equipment “used by a provider of wire or electronic 
communication services in the ordinary course of its 
business”). 
 
 The relevant facts were established in the 
summary-judgment proceedings. In its motion for 
summary judgment, Embarq asserted that it was 
undisputed that “Embarq did not have access to the 
data collected by the NebuAd System.” Aplt. App., 
Vol. II at 280. To support this contention, Embarq 
cited several statements in the record: (1) The 
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Kirches’ expert, Alissa Cooper, was asked at her 
deposition, “Did the ISP obtain access to raw data 
from NebuAd in any way other than an ISP 
ordinarily has the raw data, which is to say that it 
flows through the ISP’s network?” She responded, “I 
don’t think so.” Id. at 450. (2) The Kirches’ expert 
Andrew Case said at his deposition that Embarq did 
not have access to “the raw data collected by 
NebuAd.” Id. at 468. And (3) Embarq’s expert Dr. 
Ellis Horowitz stated in his report that Embarq 
“neither purchased, leased, nor paid for the UTA, 
which at all times was owned and controlled by 
NebuAd. The device was placed on [Embarq’s] 
network in such a way that all Internet traffic 
streaming through [Embarq’s] network would also 
pass through the UTA.” Id. at 376. 
 
 In a summary-judgment proceeding a party’s 
assertion of undisputed facts is ordinarily credited 
by the court unless properly disputed by the 
opposing party. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“If a  
party . . . fails to properly address another party’s 
assertion of fact . . . , the court may . . . (2) consider 
the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion . . . .”); 
Nahno-Lopez v. Houser, 625 F.3d 1279, 1283–84 
(10th Cir. 2010) (opponent’s response to summary-
judgment motion must raise a factual dispute that is 
material to the motion); D. Kan. Rule 56.1(b)(1) 
(memorandum in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment must “contai[n] a concise 
statement of material facts as to which the party 
contends a genuine issue exists[,] . . . refer[ring] with 
particularity to those portions of the record upon 
which the opposing party relies”); id. at 56.1(e) (“All 
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responses must fairly meet the substance of the 
matter asserted.”). 
 
 The Kirches’ response did not adequately 
dispute Embarq’s assertion. It stated only: 
“Undisputed that Embarq did not have access to the 
data after it was collected by NebuAd servers. 
However, Embarq did have access to the raw data 
when it flowed through their network.” Aplt. App., 
Vol. I at 64. In support, the Kirches cited only the 
following exchange in the Cooper deposition: 
 
Q: Did the ISP get any of the raw data 
that NebuAd may have looked at? 
 
A: I don’t know. 
 
Q: Do you have any reason to think that 
it did? 
 
A: Well, the raw data is just flowing 
over its network, so it has access to the 
raw data. 
 
Id., Vol. II at 450. Thus, the Kirches’ only 
qualification to their acceptance of the alleged 
undisputed fact was that Embarq had access to 
users’ data that it necessarily had as an ISP. 
 
 In other words, the undisputed facts establish 
that NebuAd’s use of the UTA gave Embarq access 
to no more of its users’ electronic communications 
than it had in the ordinary course of its business as 
an ISP. Embarq is therefore protected from liability 
by the statutory exemption for activities conducted 
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in the ordinary course of a service provider’s 
business. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii). 
 
 Supporting our conclusion is the Second 
Circuit’s decision in Hall v. Earthlink Network, Inc., 
396 F.3d 500 (2005). Hall used Earthlink as his ISP. 
See id. at 502. Later his account was closed, but 
several hundred emails were sent to his Earthlink 
address after the closure and stored in Earthlink 
servers. See id. Hall sued, claiming that Earthlink 
had unlawfully intercepted this mail “by 
intentionally continuing to receive messages sent [to 
his closed email address] after the termination of his 
account.” Id. The court held that Earthlink was not 
liable. It explained that “Earthlink acquired the 
contents of electronic communications but did so in 
the ordinary course of business,” so there was no 
“interception” within the statutory definition. Id. at 
504–05.3  
 
 The Kirches seek to escape the import of the 
undisputed facts by asserting that Embarq had 
“control and possession of the UTA” during the time 
it was installed on Embarq’s network. Aplt. Br. at 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 3 The court said that “[i]f ISPs were not covered by the 
ordinary course of business exception, ISPs would constantly be 
intercepting communications under ECPA because their basic 
services involve the ‘acquisition of the contents’ of electronic 
communication.” Hall, 396 F.3d at 505. As we stated above, 
however, we need not decide where to draw the line between 
access and acquisition of data. 
 The Hall court’s statement was made during its 
explanation of its holding that the course-of-business exception 
applies not only to telephone or telegraph equipment used by 
an ISP, but also to any other equipment used by an ISP. See id. 
at 504–05. That issue has not been raised in this appeal, so we 
need not address it. 
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16. But control and possession of the device is not 
the test. If such control or possession gave Embarq 
access to the contents of communications beyond 
what it acquired in the ordinary course of business, 
the Kirches needed to provide evidence of such 
access in response to Embarq’s assertion of 
undisputed fact. 
 
 The Kirches also point to two letters to 
Congress submitted by Embarq in July 2008, 
describing the NebuAd technology test and Embarq’s 
role in the test. These letters asserted that the test 
had not captured users’ confidential information and 
stated that the test was conducted in accordance 
with Embarq’s privacy policies, industry standards, 
and agency guidance. The Kirches rely on portions of 
the letters (1) stating that “Embarq conducted a 
brief, small-scale test of customer preference 
advertising utilizing a new technology,” Aplt. App., 
Vol. I at 111; (2) referring to “our consumer 
preference marketing test,” id. at 115; and (3) 
stating that “we have no plans for more tests or for 
general deployment of this technology,” id. at 118. 
The Kirches characterize these statements as a 
“clear party admission” that it was Embarq, not 
NebuAd, that used the UTA and thereby intercepted 
its users’ communications. Aplt. Br. at 17. We 
disagree. The Kirches read too much into the letters. 
The letters did not attempt to delineate the division 
of responsibility between Embarq and NebuAd. 
Indeed, they never mention NebuAd. The letters 
were in response to Congressional inquiries about 
the type of advertising examined in the technology 
test. The concern was about the nature of the 
technology and the conduct of the test. There was no 
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need or reason for Embarq’s letters to be lengthened 
by a description of who was responsible for what. 
The letters are consistent with Embarq’s account of 
the technology test in the district court and do not 
contradict the undisputed fact that Embarq’s only 
access to data collected by the UTA was in the 
ordinary course of its business as an ISP. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 We AFFIRM the judgment of the district 
court. 
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[ENTERED: August 19, 2011] 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
KATHLEEN KIRCH and TERRY KIRCH, ) 
individually, and on behalf of themselves ) 
and all others similarly situated,   ) 
        ) 
Plaintiffs,        ) 
        ) 
 v.        )  
        ) 
EMBARQ MANAGEMENT CO., a    ) 
Delaware Corporation, and UNITED   ) 
TELEPHONE COMPANY OF EASTERN   ) 
KANSAS, a Delaware Corporation, and   ) 
DOE DEFENDANTS 1-5,     ) 
        ) 
Defendants.       ) 
________________________________________________) 
 
Case No. 10-2047-JAR 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
 Kathleen and Terry Kirch filed this putative 
class action against Internet service providers 
Embarq Management Company and United 
Telephone Company of Eastern Kansas (collectively, 
“Embarq”). Plaintiffs allege common law claims for 
invasion of privacy and trespass to chattels, as well 
as claims for violation of the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (“CFAA”) and the federal Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”). All claims 
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relate to Embarq’s collection and diversion of its 
customers’ Internet communications to a third party 
Internet advertising company, NebuAd, Inc. 
(“NebuAd”), who used the information to target the 
customers with advertising. Per stipulation, 
plaintiffs agreed to dismiss Counts I, III and IV 
(invasion of privacy, CFAA and trespass to 
chattels).1 Before the Court are two motions: 
plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class (Doc. 31) and 
defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 59) 
seeking to dismiss the remaining ECPA claim. Oral 
argument was held July 15, 2011, at which time the 
Court took the motions under advisement. After 
considering the parties’ arguments and submissions, 
the Court is ready to rule. For the reasons set forth 
in detail below, the Court grants defendants’ Motion 
for Summary Judgment and denies plaintiffs’ Motion 
to Certify Class as moot.2 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 1 Doc. 60, Ex. 1. 
 
 2 The Complaint also names Doe Defendants 1-5, who 
are identified as “entities associated with Embarq and/or UTC, 
possibly with contractual obligations with Defendants, that 
may require Defendants to provide notice to the Does of this 
matter so as to appear and represent their interests. When the 
identities of any Does who are sued as Does are identified, 
Plaintiffs will amend their complaint to name such parties.” 
Although a plaintiff may generally plead claims against 
unknown defendants, he must “provide [] an adequate 
description of some kind which is sufficient to identify the 
person involved so process eventually can be served.” Fisher v. 
Okla. Dep’t of Corr. Unknown State Actor and/or Actors, 213 F. 
App’x 704, 708 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Roper v. Grayson, 
81 F.3d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1996)). Here, the Complaint does 
not allege with any specificity which claims involve the Doe 
defendants or what roles those unknown individuals might 
have played in this matter, nor have plaintiffs moved to amend 
the Complaint to name such parties. Because all other claims 
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I. Procedural Background 
 
 In November, 2008, plaintiffs Kathleen and 
Terry Kirch, as well as others, brought suit in the 
Northern District of California against NebuAd, 
Embarq, and several other Internet service providers 
(“ISPs”), alleging violations of the ECPA.3 Embarq 
moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, and the 
California court dismissed the complaint against 
Embarq and the other ISPs for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. Plaintiffs refiled against Embarq in the 
District of Kansas; other plaintiffs refiled against 
other ISPs in Montana, Alabama, Georgia, and 
Illinois, using common counsel in Los Angeles. 
Plaintiffs continue to pursue their case against 
NebuAd in California. 
 
II. Summary Judgment Standard 
 
 Summary judgment is appropriate if the 
moving party demonstrates that there is “no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact” and that it is 
“entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”4 In 
applying this standard, the court views the evidence 
and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party.5 A fact is 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
against Embarq are dismissed below, the Court dismisses these 
Doe defendants as well. 
 
 3 Valentine et al. v. NebuAd Inc., et al., No. 3:08-cv-
05113 (N.D. Cal.). 
 
 4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
 
 5 Spaulding v. United Transp. Union, 279 F.3d 901, 904 
(10th Cir. 2002). 
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“material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it 
is “essential to the proper disposition of the claim.”6 
An issue of fact is “genuine” if “there is sufficient 
evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact 
could resolve the issue either way.”7 
 
 The moving party initially must show the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact and 
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.8 In 
attempting to meet this standard, a movant that 
does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at 
trial need not negate the other party’s claim; rather, 
the movant need simply point out to the court a lack 
of evidence for the other party on an essential 
element of that party’s claim.9 
 
 Once the movant has met this initial burden, 
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to “set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.”10 The nonmoving party may not 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 6 Wright ex rel. Trust Co. of Kan. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 
259 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Adler v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998)). 
 
 7 Adler, 144 F.3d at 670 (citing Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). 
 
 8 Spaulding, 279 F.3d at 904 (citing Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). 
 
 9 Adams v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 
1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Adler, 144 F.3d at 671). 
 
 10 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; 
Spaulding, 279 F.3d at 904 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. 
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). 
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simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden.11 
Rather, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific 
facts that would be admissible in evidence in the 
event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could 
find for the nonmovant.”12 To accomplish this, the 
facts “must be identified by reference to an affidavit, 
a deposition transcript, or a specific exhibit 
incorporated therein.”13 Rule 56(c)(4) provides that 
opposing affidavits must be made on personal 
knowledge and shall set forth such facts as would be 
admissible in evidence.14 The non-moving party 
cannot avoid summary judgment by repeating 
conclusory opinions, allegations unsupported by 
specific facts, or speculation.15 “ 
 
 Finally, summary judgment is not a 
“disfavored procedural shortcut”; on the contrary, it 
is an important procedure “designed to secure the 
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action.”16 In responding to a motion for summary 
judgment, “a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts, 
on speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 11 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; accord Eck v. Parke, Davis 
& Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1017 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 
 12 Mitchell v. City of Moore, Okla., 218 F.3d 1190, 1197-
98 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Adler, 144 F.3d at 671). 
 
 13 Adams, 233 F.3d at 1246. 
 
 14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). 
 
 15 Id.; Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 
452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 
 
 16 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 
(1986)(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). 
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summary judgment in the mere hope that something 
will turn up at trial.”17 
 
III. Uncontroverted Facts 
 
 Consistent with the well-established standard 
for evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the 
following facts are either uncontroverted or stated in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. The 
Court notes that the majority of the facts set forth by 
Embarq are either undisputed, or that plaintiffs 
claim to lack information to dispute the facts 
asserted. With respect to the latter, however, 
plaintiffs do not assert that relief is appropriate 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), and because Rule 56(e) 
requires a plaintiff to properly address another 
party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), 
the Court thus considers such facts as undisputed.18 
 
 United Telephone Company of Eastern 
Kansas (“UTC”) is, among other things, an ISP that 
provides high-speed Internet services to subscribers 
in Kansas. At all relevant times, UTC did business 
under the brand name “Embarq.” Embarq 
Management Company (“EMC”) is a corporate 
affiliate of UTC and provides contracted products, 
services, and employees to UTC and other 
CenturyLink subsidiaries. EMC provides no services 
to the public and has no customer-facing operations. 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 17 Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 
1988). 
 
 18 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; D. Kan. Rule 56.1(e) (requiring 
responding party to specifically set forth in detail the reasons 
why they cannot admit or deny a fact). 
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 NebuAd’s Role 
 
 NebuAd is a company headquartered in 
California that operated as an online advertising 
company. NebuAd contracted with a number of ISPs 
to allow it to install its Ultra-Transparent Appliance 
(“UTA”) on the ISPs’ networks. NebuAd sought to 
deliver advertisements targeted to the interests of 
individuals who used the ISPs’ networks, based on 
interest profiles constructed by NebuAd’s UTA and 
associated server computers (“the NebuAd System”). 
The NebuAd System built interest profiles based on 
information concerning certain websites that users 
visited. 
 
 In November 2007, on behalf of UTC, EMC 
entered into a Technology Trial Evaluation 
Agreement with NebuAd to test the UTA. Company 
personnel performed laboratory tests and 
determined that routing Internet traffic through the 
UTA did not affect network integrity or performance. 
After laboratory testing was complete, it was decided 
to allow NebuAd to field test the UTA in a “live” 
environment. UTC’s Gardner, Kansas point of 
presence was selected for the test (“the NebuAd 
test”) because it was the smallest point of presence, 
with approximately 26,000 high-speed Internet 
subscribers, and it was proximate to qualified 
technical and product development staff. EMC does 
not own the network facilities on which the NebuAd 
equipment was installed; rather, those network 
facilities are owned and operated by UTC. The 
NebuAd test began in mid-December 2007 and was 
stopped completely by the end of March 2008. 
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Embarq received $29,143 from NebuAd as 
compensation for the NebuAd test. 
 
 Plaintiffs’ experts admitted that NebuAd’s 
UTA did not degrade the performance of any 
customer’s Internet service, and plaintiffs have 
stipulated that NebuAd’s UTA caused no damage to 
any Embarq customer’s computer. The NebuAd 
System did not serve pop-up advertisements. The 
System did not increase the number of 
advertisements served to a user, but rather, served 
advertisements only in place of the advertisements 
that otherwise would have been served to the user. 
The System was authorized by other advertising 
networks to replace their advertisements with its 
own. 
 
 All Internet traffic that passed through UTC’s 
Gardner point of presence flowed through NebuAd’s 
UTA. NebuAd’s UTA identified the “port number” 
associated with each internet communication 
passing through UTC’s Gardner point of presence. 
Different port numbers are associated with different 
types of Internet communications. Port 80 is 
associated with “HTTP traffic,” and only websites 
whose addresses begin with “http://” are accessed 
through Port 80. An IP address is a series of 
numbers associated with a server or website, and it 
is used to route traffic to the proper destination on 
the Internet. The NebuAd System employed a 
technology called “deep packet inspection” (“DPI”) to 
identify the URL requested by a user. A URL, which 
stands for “Uniform Resource Locator,” is the 
address of a page on the world wide web. URLs 
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specify the host server name, directory, and file 
name of the Web page that a user seeks to visit. 
 
 The NebuAd System also used DPI to access 
cookies sent to and from advertising networks, as 
well as the URL of the “referer” page, i.e., the web 
page received by the user’s computer immediately 
prior to its request for a new page. A cookie is a piece 
of text, usually encrypted, that is sent to a user’s 
computer by a website. When the user later returns 
to the website, the website recognizes the cookie and 
thus is able to track a user’s behavior over time. 
Cookies are regularly used on the Internet to store 
site preferences, retain a user’s shopping cart 
contents, or, in the case of advertising networks, 
allow the advertising network to recognize the same 
user across a wide array of different websites. The 
advertising network cookies observed by the NebuAd 
system were typically encrypted, meaning they 
would have appeared as a long string of numbers 
and letters that were unreadable, so the NebuAd 
System did not extract any information from them. 
 
 The NebuAd System used the long string of 
numbers and letters constituting an advertising 
network cookie to help create an anonymized 
identification number it assigned to each user’s 
computer. The System created a profile linked to the 
anonymized identification number. Profiles were 
associated with a user’s computer solely through the 
anonymized identifier number that the NebuAd 
System had assigned. NebuAd designed its System 
with the intention that it would not have been 
possible to “reverse engineer” its anonymized 
identifier numbers and identify the actual users 
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associated with them. There is no evidence that 
anyone ever attempted or succeeded in identifying 
any actual users associated with the identifier 
numbers or the profiles created by the NebuAd 
System. A profile stored information concerning 
what the NebuAd System had inferred to be a user’s 
market interests, based upon the URLs it obtained. 
When the NebuAd System saw a URL that had 
previously been identified as reflecting a certain 
market interest, the computers in the NebuAd 
System converted the URL into a code signifying a 
market interest and then deleted the raw data. The 
NebuAd System then created or updated a profile to 
reflect the market interests it observed. The process 
of converting a URL into a code signifying a market 
interest and then deleting the raw data likely took 
microseconds, and no more than a minute. The 
process of extracting URLs, converting them to 
predefined market interests, and updating user 
profiles was entirely automated and involved no 
human intervention. The targeted advertisements 
that the NebuAd System served were based upon the 
de-identified profiles it had constructed. 
 
 Embarq’s Role 
 
 NebuAd remotely configured the UTA to make 
the device operable. Thereafter, the NebuAd System 
collected information, created de-identified user 
profiles and served ads. Plaintiffs’ expert, Alissa 
Cooper, testified that her understanding of Embarq’s 
role with respect to the NebuAd System as the ISP 
was that Embarq “furnished the connection to the 
NebuAd equipment, so, it essentially connected its 
users to the UTA, and it connected the UTA to the 
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rest of its networks.” Cooper testified that there was 
no other involvement by the ISP, other than it was 
paid, and that Embarq did not serve any 
advertisements based upon the user profiles 
developed by the NebuAd System. Cooper further 
testified that Embarq did not have access to the data 
collected or the user profiles developed by the 
NebuAd System, and that any access Embarq had to 
the raw data was access that any ISP ordinarily has 
to raw data that flows through the ISP’s network.19 
 
 Consent/Privacy Policy 
 
 As a condition of the High-Speed Internet 
Activation Customer Agreement (“Activation 
Agreement”), Embarq subscribers were required to 
agree to the terms of Embarq’s Privacy Policy.20 The 
Activation Agreement states that 
 
EMBARQ’S network gathers 
information about Internet usage such 
as the sites visited, session lengths, bit 
rates, and number of messages and 
bytes passes. EMBARQ uses this 
information in the aggregate. EMBARQ 
may share this aggregated information 
with other parties from time to time. 
EMBARQ also collects and uses 
personally identifiable information 
obtained from you and from other 
sources for billing purposes, to provide 
and change service, to anticipate and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 19 Doc. 60, Ex. 6. 
 
 20 Doc. 60, Ex. 2-A. 
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resolve problems with your service, or to 
identify, create and inform you of 
products and services that better meet 
your needs. Except as otherwise 
provided in this Section, EMBARQ will 
not use or disclose any of your 
personally identifiable information 
unless compelled by a court order or 
subpoena, you consent to the use of 
disclosure, or to protect its broadband 
services and facilities. . . . EMBARQ’s 
provision of Services to you is also 
subject to EMBARQ’s broadband 
privacy policies, which are found at 
http://www.embarq.com/legal/privacy.ht
ml/broadbandservices and are hereby 
incorporated by reference.21 
 
 The Activation Agreement informed 
subscribers that “EMBARQ may revise, modify or 
discontinue any or all aspects of the Services, 
including but not limited to . . . any terms of this 
Agreement, upon posting of the new terms on the 
EMBARQ website at www.EMBARQ.com.” The 
Activation Agreement states that it “is a legally 
binding contract that should be read in its entirety,” 
and instructs customers to click on the “accept” 
button if they agree with each and every term set 
forth in the Activation Agreement.22 
 
 Embarq’s Privacy Policy, effective November 
2007, informed subscribers that “[d]e-identified data 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 21 Id. 
 
 22 Id. 
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also might be purchased by or shared with a third 
party.” The Privacy Policy further states that 
Embarq could disclose to third party business 
partners “customer proprietary network 
information,” (“CPNI”), which is defined to include 
“the websites you visit,” to enable business partners 
to assist in providing Embarq’s service. The Privacy 
Policy also states that “EMBARQ does not disclose 
CPNI and other nonpublic personal information 
(such as credit card numbers), without your consent 
or direction, except to business partners involved in 
providing EMBARQ service to customers or as 
required or permitted by law.” Subscribers were also 
notified that the Privacy Policy could be updated 
periodically to reflect changing practices, specifically 
that “[i]f at any point we decide to use personally 
identifiable information in a manner that is 
materially different from what was stated at the 
time it was collected, we will notify you via posting 
on this page for 30 days before the material change 
is made and give you an opportunity to opt out of the 
proposed use at any time.” 
 
 Prior to the NebuAd test, Embarq added to 
the section of its Privacy Policy concerning “USE OF 
PERSONAL INFORMATION” a paragraph entitled, 
“Preference Advertising” that stated: 
 
Embarq may use information such as 
the websites you visit or online searches 
that you conduct to deliver or facilitate 
the delivery of targeted advertisements. 
The delivery of these advertisements 
will be based on anonymous surfing 
behavior and will not include users’ 
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names, email addresses, telephone 
numbers, or any other Personally 
Identifiable Information. 
 
You may choose to opt out of this 
preference advertising service. By 
opting out, you will continue to receive 
advertisements as normal; but  
these advertisements will be less 
relevant and less useful to you. If you 
would like to opt out, click here. 
(embarq.com/adsoptions) 
 
Although all traffic, including that of customers who 
opted out, flowed through the UTA, by clicking on 
the “opt out” link in the Privacy Policy, a subscriber 
could ensure that the NebuAd System would not 
create a profile of that subscriber and would not 
serve any targeted advertisements to that 
subscriber. Plaintiffs did not opt out of the 
Preference Advertising service. Kathleen Kirch 
testified that she does not recall reviewing Embarq’s 
Privacy Policy and that she did not make a practice 
of reviewing privacy policies of any Internet service 
she signed up for or websites that she visited. 
Instead, she just clicked “I agree,” and continued on 
to the site. Kirch further testified that she 
understood that when she did so, she was bound by 
the terms of the policy.23 
 
IV. Discussion 
 
 Plaintiffs, representing a putative class, allege 
that for a period exceeding ninety days in 2008, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 23 Doc. 60 at Ex. 10. 
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Embarq, as an ISP, collected and diverted 
approximately 26,000 of its Gardner, Kansas 
customers’ internet communications to NebuAd, a 
third-party internet advertising company, who used 
the information to target the customers with 
advertisements. Plaintiffs allege Embarq’s actions 
constitute a violation of Title II of the ECPA, which 
Act amended the Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et 
seq. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) provides for criminal 
penalties where a person “intentionally intercepts, 
endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person 
to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, 
or electronic communication,” as well as where one 
person “intentionally discloses” to another, or 
“intentionally uses or endeavors to use, the contents 
of any . . . electronic communication, knowing or 
having reason to know that the information was 
obtained through the interception of a[n] electronic 
communication.” By contrast, the civil liability 
provision set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2520 states that 
“any person whose wire, oral, or electronic 
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or 
intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in 
a civil action recover from the person or entity which 
engaged in that violation.” 
 
 Embarq argues that it cannot be held civilly 
liable under the ECPA because § 2520(a) does not 
provide for liability of aiders and abettors and that 
Embarq itself did not intercept plaintiffs’ electronic 
communications in violation of the ECPA. 
Alternatively, Embarq argues that even if it had 
intercepted an electronic communication, plaintiffs 
consented to the interception and use of their 
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electronic communications. The Court addresses 
each issue in turn. 
 
A. Secondary Liability 
 
 Plaintiffs argue that the NebuAd System 
violated the ECPA because it intercepted or acquired 
the “contents” of Embarq’s customers’ Internet 
communications. Highly simplified, plaintiffs assert 
that “the UTA intercepted and analyzed all of the 
traffic that passed through it.” Embarq counters that 
the UTA merely identified the port number of a 
communication and the URLs acquired by the 
NebuAd System were functionally no different from 
a telephone number acquired by a pen register; it is 
merely the address of the webpage requested by the 
user, not the webpage itself, and thus is a “means of 
establishing communication.”24 The Court need not 
resolve this issue, however, because even assuming 
plaintiffs’ position is correct, Embarq cannot be held 
secondarily liable for having aided and abetted 
NebuAd’s alleged interception. 
 
 Plaintiffs argue that Embarq intercepted 
communications by routing them to NebuAd’s UTA. 
The term “intercept” is specifically defined by the 
ECPA to mean the “acquisition of the contents” of a 
communication.”25 “Contents” is defined to mean 
“the substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication.”26 Although the term “acquisition” is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 24 See New York Tele. Co., 434 U.S. at 167. 
 
 25 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4). 
 
 26 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). 
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not defined by the statute, “to acquire” commonly 
means “to come into possession, control, or power of 
disposal.”27 Thus, it follows that in order to 
“intercept” a communication, one must come into 
possession or control of the substance, purport, or 
meaning of that communication. The Court agrees 
with Embarq that regardless of what information 
the NebuAd System extracted from the 
communications traversing through the UTA, it is 
undisputed that Embarq had no access to that 
information or to the profiles constructed from that 
information.28 As plaintiffs’ expert testified, 
Embarq’s role was to install the NebuAd device so as 
to furnish the UTA connection to NebuAd. In other 
words, the NebuAd device, or “box,” goes into place, 
then all of the raw data that flows through Embarq 
is directed to that device, where NebuAd does the 
analysis and, apparently, separates out the Port 80 
traffic. Moreover, plaintiffs cite no authority that 
Embarq’s access to the raw data that flowed through 
its network constitutes a violation of the ECPA, 
which requires an entity to actually acquire the 
contents of those communications. There is nothing 
in the record that Embarq itself acquired the 
contents of any communications as they flowed 
through its network; instead, plaintiffs’ theory rests 
on the notion that the NebuAd System extracted the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 27 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 18-19 (1986). 
 
 28 Incredibly, at oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel went 
so far as to claim that Embarq employees reviewed the raw 
data and transported information of their choosing to NebuAd. 
Plaintiffs do not cite, nor could the Court locate, anything in 
the record to support this assertion, which is contradicted by 
testimony of plaintiffs’ experts. 
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contents of the communications. Plaintiffs’  
assertion that Embarq “endeavored to intercept” 
communications falls short of creating civil liability 
under the ECPA, which creates liability for actual 
interception. 
 
 In an apparent effort to avoid this result, 
plaintiffs seek to hold Embarq secondarily liable 
based upon its contractual relationship with 
NebuAd, emphasizing that Embarq licensed the 
UTA owned by NebuAd and allowed NebuAd to 
access its network. Plaintiffs, in effect, seek to hold 
Embarq indirectly liable as a procurer, aider, 
abettor, or co-conspirator of NebuAd’s alleged 
violation of the ECPA. The civil liability provision of 
the ECPA, however, does not provide for secondary 
liability, as liability attaches only to the party that 
actually intercepted a communication.29 As 
numerous courts have consistently held, a defendant 
does not “intercept” a communication merely by 
allowing or enabling, or even directing, another 
party to intercept communications.30 For example, in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 29 18 U.S.C. § 2520. 
 
 30 See, e.g., Freeman v. DirectTV, Inc., 457 F.3d 1001, 
1005-06 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the argument that “a person 
or entity who aids and abets or who enters into a conspiracy is 
someone or something that is ‘engaged’ in a violation.”); Doe v. 
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[N]othing in the 
statute condemns assistants, as opposed to those who directly 
perpetrate the act.”); Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158, 
168-69 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); Reynolds v. Spears, 93 F.3d 428, 
432-33 (8th Cir. 1996); Crowley v. CyberSource Corp., 166 F. 
Supp. 2d 1263, 1269 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Perkins-Carillo v. 
Systemax, Inc., No. 03-2836, 2006 WL 1553957 (N.D. Ga. May 
26, 2006); In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litig., No. 00-2746, 
2001 WL 34517252, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001). 
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In re Toys R Us, Inc., Privacy Litigation,31 plaintiffs 
sought to hold Toys R Us liable under the Wiretap 
Act for permitting a third party, Coremetrics, to load 
“Web bugs” onto the computers of visitors to Toys R 
Us’ website.32 Coremetrics was in the business of 
tracking Internet users’ buying and websurfing 
habits, and its device enabled it to “monitor, 
intercept, transmit, and record all aspects of a 
Webuser’s private activity when they access Toys R 
Us’ Webpages or other Webpages.”33 The district 
court granted Toys R Us’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ 
Wiretap Act claim, holding that the “plain language 
of § 2205(a) now limits its applicability to those who 
‘intercept,’ ‘disclose,’ or ‘use’ the communications at 
issue” and that Toys R Us could not be held liable 
because there was no allegation that Toys R Us itself 
intercepted any communications.34 Such is the case 
here, and plaintiffs cite no authority to the contrary. 
 
 Because the record shows that Embarq did not 
acquire any of the information obtained by the 
NebuAd System, under the plain language of the 
ECPA, Embarq did not itself intercept any 
communications and cannot be held secondarily 
liable. Accordingly, Embarq is entitled to summary 
judgment on this ground. 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 
 31 2001 WL 34517252. 
 
 32 Id. at *6-7. 
 
 33 Id. at *1. 
 
 34 Id. at *6-7. 
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B. Consent 
 
 Embarq is also independently entitled to 
summary judgment based on plaintiffs’ consent, 
which is expressly excluded from the category of 
“unlawful interceptions.”35 In two other cases 
brought by plaintiffs’ law firm arising out of NebuAd 
System tests conducted in Montana, the district 
court dismissed the ECPA count based on similar 
language contained in the ISPs’ privacy policies.36 In 
those cases, the court considered the Terms of 
Service documents of the ISPs, and found that the 
plaintiff Internet subscribers were put on notice of 
the NebuAd monitoring via the defendant ISPs’ 
updates to those terms.37 As the court explained, 
because that document indicated that “[u]se of [the 
ISP’s] Internet access services was expressly subject 
to the [Terms of Service]” and the plaintiff continued 
to use the Internet, he was bound by the changes to 
the agreement and impliedly consented to the 
monitoring of his Internet activity.38 Likewise, the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 35 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (no liability “where one of the 
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such 
interception.”). 
 
 36 See Deering v. CenturyTel, Inc., No. 10-63-BLG-RFC, 
2011 WL 1842859 (D. Mont. May 16, 2011); Mortensen v. 
Bresnan Commc’ns, L.L.C., No. 10-13-BLG-RFC, 2010 WL 
5140454 (D. Mont. Dec. 13, 2010). A similar motion to dismiss 
on consent grounds is pending in yet another NebuAd case filed 
in Illinois, Valentine v. Wideopen West Fin., LLC, Case No. 09-
cv-7653 (E.D. Ill.). 
 
 37 See Deering, 2011 WL 1842859, at *1-3, Mortensen, 
2010 WL 5140454, at *4-5. 
 
 38 Deering, 2011 WL 1842859, at *1-3. 
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Court finds that in this case plaintiffs consented to 
the use by third parties of their de-identified web-
browsing behavior when they accessed the Internet 
under the terms of Embarq’s Privacy Policy, 
incorporated by reference into its Activation 
Agreement. 
 
 Embarq’s Activation Agreement informed 
subscribers that “EMBARQ may revise, modify or 
discontinue any or all aspects of the Services, 
including but not limited to . . . any terms of this 
Agreement, upon posting of the new terms on the 
EMBARQ website at www.EMBARQ.com.” Plaintiffs 
do not dispute that, in advance of the NebuAd test, 
Embarq posted a new paragraph in its Privacy 
Policy entitled “Preference Advertising,” in which it 
informed subscribers that “Embarq may use 
information such as the websites you visit or online 
searches that you conduct to deliver or facilitate the 
delivery of targeted advertisements. The delivery of 
these advertisements will be based on anonymous 
surfing behavior.” Subscribers were then offered the 
opportunity to opt out by clicking on a hypertext 
link. Moreover, a preexisting paragraph in the 
Privacy Policy informed subscribers that “[d]e-
identified data might be purchased by or shared with 
a third party.” The pre-existing Privacy Policy also 
explained that Embarq would automatically “log the 
websites you visit,” and that such information, which 
constitutes CPNI, could be shared with “business 
partners involved in providing EMBARQ service to 
customers.” Thus, as with the Montana cases, 
plaintiffs consented to monitoring by using Embarq’s 
Internet service after notice, and that notice and 
consent defeats their ECPA claim. 
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 Nevertheless, plaintiffs assert several reasons 
why their use of Embarq’s Internet service did not 
constitute consent to the NebuAd test. The Court 
will briefly address these arguments, which are 
without merit. First, plaintiffs argue that the scope 
of the disclosure was inadequate because NebuAd is 
not identified specifically as a third party with which 
information might be shared. Plaintiffs cite no 
authority requiring such specific disclosure, and fail 
to address the fact that the Privacy Policy expressly 
discloses that de-identified data and the websites a 
subscriber visits might be shared with third parties. 
While it is true that NebuAd was identified 
specifically in one of the cases,39 the Montana court 
did not appear to make such a distinction, instead 
focusing on the fact that the terms of the agreements 
and privacy policies in those cases existed and were 
in effect before the NebuAd test, and also mentioned 
third parties generally.40 Second, plaintiffs’ 
argument that the notice was not conspicuous 
enough is belied by their admission that the 
prevailing industry practice among websites is to 
disclose their relationship with advertising networks 
and the type of information those networks collect, 
in their privacy policies. Plaintiffs cite no authority 
that such method of disclosure is inadequate, and 
the Montana case decisions dismissing on the ground 
of consent hold to the contrary.41 Finally, plaintiffs’ 
argument that the opt-out mechanism was 
insufficient because it did not prevent the NebuAd 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 39 Id. at *2. 
 
 40 Id. at *2-3; Mortensen, 2010 WL 5140454, at *5. 
 
 41 Id. 
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System’s collection of data does not negate their 
consent because they did not attempt to opt out. 
Plaintiffs do not dispute that the opt-out mechanism 
was effective in that, by opting out, subscribers did 
not receive any targeted advertising. 
 
 In sum, plaintiffs were required to agree to 
the terms of the Activation Agreement in order to 
use Embarq’s Internet service; that Agreement 
incorporated the terms of the Privacy Policy, which 
informed subscribers that their de-identified data 
could be shared with third parties; that Agreement 
informed subscribers that the terms could be 
changed at any time through posting a new policy at 
Embarq’s website; and Embarq modified those terms 
in advance of the NebuAd test to add a paragraph 
regarding preference advertising, with an opt-out 
mechanism. For these reasons, the Court joins with 
the Montana court in concluding that plaintiffs gave 
or acquiesced their consent to any monitoring or 
interception of their Internet activity, and summary 
judgment is granted on this ground.42 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
 42 Because the Court grants summary judgment on 
secondary liability and consent grounds, it does not reach the 
issue of Embarq’s alternative “ordinary course of business” 
defense. The Court notes that this defense also appears to have 
merit, as plaintiffs have admitted that Embarq conducted the 
NebuAd test to further legitimate business purposes and that 
behavioral advertising is a widespread business and is 
commonplace on the Internet. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) requires an 
interception must take place “through the use of any electronic, 
mechanical, or other device”; that phrase is defined to exclude 
“any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept  
a[n] . . . electronic communication” that is “being used by a 
provider of wire or electronic communication device in the 
ordinary course of business.” Id. § 2510(5)(a)(ii). 
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 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE 
COURT that defendants’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Doc. 59) is GRANTED; 
 
 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs’ 
Motion to Certify Class (Doc. 31) is DENIED as 
moot. 
 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Dated: August 19, 2011 
 
S/ Julie A. Robinson 
JULIE A. ROBINSON 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS  
PRIVACY ACT 
 
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2510 provides, in relevant part: 
 
As used in this chapter— 
 
[…] 
 
(4) “intercept” means the aural or other 
acquisition of the contents of any wire, 
electronic, or oral communication through the 
use of any electronic, mechanical, or other 
device.  
 
(5) “electronic, mechanical, or other device” 
means any device or apparatus which can be 
used to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication other than— 
 
(a) any telephone or telegraph 
instrument, equipment or facility, or 
any component thereof, 
 
(i) furnished to the subscriber or 
user by a provider of wire or 
electronic communication service 
in the ordinary course of its 
business and being used by the 
subscriber or user in the ordinary 
course of its business or 
furnished by such subscriber or 
user for connection to the 
facilities of such service and used 
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in the ordinary course of its 
business; or 
 
(ii) being used by a provider of 
wire or electronic communication 
service in the ordinary course of 
its business, or by an 
investigative or law enforcement 
officer in the ordinary course of 
his duties; 
 
[…] 
 
(8) “contents”, when used with respect to any 
wire, oral, or electronic communication, 
includes any information concerning the 
substance, purport, or meaning of that 
communication; 
 
[…] 
 
(12) “electronic communication” means any 
transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, 
radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or 
photooptical system that affects interstate or 
foreign commerce, but does not include— 
 
(A) any wire or oral communication; 
 
(B) any communication made through a 
tone-only paging device; 
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(C) any communication from a tracking 
device (as defined in section 3117 of this 
title); or 
 
(D) electronic funds transfer 
information stored by a financial 
institution in a communications system 
used for the electronic storage and 
transfer of funds; 
 
(13) “user” means any person or entity who— 
 
(A) uses an electronic communication 
service; and 
 
(B) is duly authorized by the provider of 
such service to engage in such use; 
 
(14) “electronic communications system” 
means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, 
photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for 
the transmission of wire or electronic 
communications, and any computer facilities 
or related electronic equipment for the 
electronic storage of such communications; 
 
(15) “electronic communication service” means 
any service which provides to users thereof 
the ability to send or receive wire or electronic 
communications; 
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Title 18 U.S.C. § 2511 provides, in relevant part: 
 
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in 
this chapter any person who –  
 
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors 
to intercept, or procures any other 
person to intercept or endeavor to 
intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication; 
 
[…] 
 
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors 
to disclose, to any other person the 
contents of any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication, knowing or having 
reason to know that the information 
was obtained through the interception 
of a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication in violation of this 
subsection; 
 
(d) intentionally uses, or endeavors to 
use, the contents of any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication, knowing or 
having reason to know that the 
information was obtained through the 
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication in violation of this 
subsection; or 
 
[…] 
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shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) 
or shall be subject to suit as provided in 
subsection (5). 
 
(2)(a)(i) It shall not be unlawful under this 
chapter for an operator of a switchboard, or an 
officer, employee, or agent of a provider of 
wire or electronic communication service, 
whose facilities are used in the transmission 
of a wire or electronic communication, to 
intercept, disclose, or use that communication 
in the normal course of his employment while 
engaged in any activity which is a necessary 
incident to the rendition of his service or to 
the protection of the rights or property of the 
provider of that service, except that a provider 
of wire communication service to the public 
shall not utilize service observing or random 
monitoring except for mechanical or service 
quality control checks. 
 
(ii) Notwithstanding any other law, providers 
of wire or electronic communication service, 
their officers, employees, and agents, 
landlords, custodians, or other persons, are 
authorized to provide information, facilities, 
or technical assistance to persons authorized 
by law to intercept wire, oral, or electronic 
communications or to conduct electronic 
surveillance, as defined in section 101 of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 
if such provider, its officers, employees, or 
agents, landlord, custodian, or other specified 
person, has been provided with-- 
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(A) a court order directing such 
assistance or a court order pursuant to 
section 704 of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 signed by the 
authorizing judge, or 
 
(B) a certification in writing by a person 
specified in section 2518(7) of this title 
or the Attorney General of the United 
States that no warrant or court order is 
required by law, that all statutory 
requirements have been met, and that 
the specified assistance is required,  
 
setting forth the period of time during which 
the provision of the information, facilities, or 
technical assistance is authorized and 
specifying the information, facilities, or 
technical assistance required. No provider of 
wire or electronic communication service, 
officer, employee, or agent thereof, or 
landlord, custodian, or other specified person 
shall disclose the existence of any interception 
or surveillance or the device used to 
accomplish the interception or surveillance 
with respect to which the person has been 
furnished a court order or certification under 
this chapter, except as may otherwise be 
required by legal process and then only after 
prior notification to the Attorney General or to 
the principal prosecuting attorney of a State 
or any political subdivision of a State, as may 
be appropriate. Any such disclosure, shall 
render such person liable for the civil damages 
provided for in section 2520. No cause of 
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action shall lie in any court against any 
provider of wire or electronic communication 
service, its officers, employees, or agents, 
landlord, custodian, or other specified person 
for providing information, facilities, or 
assistance in accordance with the terms of a 
court order, statutory authorization, or 
certification under this chapter. 
 
[…] 
 
(3)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of 
this subsection, a person or entity providing 
an electronic communication service to the 
public shall not intentionally divulge the 
contents of any communication (other than 
one to such person or entity, or an agent 
thereof) while in transmission on that service 
to any person or entity other than an 
addressee or intended recipient of such 
communication or an agent of such addressee 
or intended recipient. 
 
(b) A person or entity providing electronic 
communication service to the public may 
divulge the contents of any such 
communication-- 
 
(i) as otherwise authorized in section 
2511(2)(a) or 2517 of this title; 
 
(ii) with the lawful consent of the 
originator or any addressee or intended 
recipient of such communication; 
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(iii) to a person employed or authorized, 
or whose facilities are used, to forward 
such communication to its destination; 
or 
 
(iv) which were inadvertently obtained 
by the service provider and which 
appear to pertain to the commission of a 
crime, if such divulgence is made to a 
law enforcement agency. 
 
[…] 
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Title 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) provides, in relevant part: 
 
Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), 
any person whose wire, oral, or electronic 
communication is intercepted, disclosed, or 
intentionally used in violation of this chapter 
may in a civil action recover from the person 
or entity, other than the United States, which 
engaged in that violation such relief as may be 
appropriate. 
  
  
 
